IT Security Company ESET has discovered a strain of malware called Industroyer, which could prove to be the greatest cyber threat to critical infrastructure since the notorious Stuxnet.
Specifically designed to interfere with critical infrastructure, Industroyer has the technical potential to be more formidable than Stuxnet, as it is configurable to specific industrial systems, rather than being limited to individual industries.
Stuxnet was a malicious computer worm that was first identified in 2010. The worm is most well known for the catastrophic damage inflicted upon Iran’s nuclear program.
Industroyer is able to take direct control of electricity substation circuit breakers using industrial communication protocols. These protocols are used globally in power supply infrastructure and transportation control systems, but also in areas such as water and gas.
The Industroyer malware poses a threat to a vast number of people with its ability to attack infrastructure such as water and power plants; the prospect of attack such as this is becoming ever more realistic following attacks like the SCADA attack on the Ukrainian power grid in 2015.
In a blog post by ESET, the conclusion was formed that ‘it’s highly probable that Industroyer was used in the December 2016 attack on the Ukranian power grid’.
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A test facility within a university in the United States has already proven the possibility of hackers accessing the systems of a water plant, and adjusting the levels of chlorine in the supply.
The protocols that Industroyer works upon were designed decades ago, before cyber security was considered a necassary factor to be included in their creation.
Andrew Clarke, EMEA Director at One Identity said: “There is no doubt that malware has progressively become more sophisticated—the latest variant to grab the headlines “Industroyer” or Crash Override as it is also known; seems to be a big leap forward. Unlike Stuxnet, it does not appear to be built for a specific attack; it is modular; automated and appears to be configurable to target different types of industrial systems – so far electrical power grids. It was likely used to close down the power grid in parts of Kiev, Ukraine in December 2016.”
Addressing the process required to defend this critical infrastructure, Paul Edon, Director at Tripwire said: “Post design security is always a much greater challenge than the “security by design and default” that we would expect today. However, the majority of attacks can still be defended against by employing the same strategy as that used for the enterprise i.e. “Security Best Practise”, “Defence in Depth” and “ Foundational Controls”.
